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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In just over a decade Chinese policy banks have emerged as global leaders in development 
finance in general and in finance for energy projects in developing country governments 
in particular. Moving forward, China has founded or co-founded two new multi-lateral 
development banks (MDBs) and at least 13 regional and bilateral funds that will increase 
Chinese development finance abroad by orders of magnitude. Such a stepwise increase in 
global development finance arrives just in time, as the world faces major infrastructure and 
energy gaps and has just committed to increasing finance for sustainable development on 
a global scale.  
China’s global energy portfolio is heavily exposed to country, macroeconomic, 
climate, and social risks however. To mitigate such risks and meet the broader sustainable 
development challenge for the 21st Century, China’s development finance will need to shift 
the composition of its global energy lending in a significant manner.
This paper provides the first estimates of China’s global developmental finance 
institutions in general and China’s policy bank lending to foreign governments for energy 
in particular. We find that: China’s ‘policy banks’ and funds have doubled the availability of 
global development finance –and hold more assets than the major Western-backed MDBs 
operating in developing countries. With the onset of a new family of funds and multilateral 
development banks co-financed by China, China is poised to be the largest development 
lender in the world as Western-backed MDBs appear stagnated in their ability to increase 
their capital bases.  
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2• China’s national development banks already lent as much to foreign governments for energy 
as all the major Western-backed MDBs combined.  Between 2007 and 2014 Chinese banks 
doubled the amount of energy financing available to national governments, adding another 
$117.5 billion dollars in energy finance for foreign governments.  Not only did Chinese 
finance increase the total amount of finance, Chinese banks are financing energy projects all 
over the world and expanding the set of countries that receive energy financing as well.
• Chinese energy finance is exposed to significant country and macroeconomic risk. In contrast 
with the Western-backed development banks across the world, Chinese policy banks are 
engaged with countries with higher country risk ratings and in commodity-backed loans that 
risk stress given the fall in commodity prices and associated macroeconomic downturns in 
the developing world.
• Chinese development banks are heavily exposed to climate and social risk. China’s energy 
loans are highly concentrated in fossil fuel extraction and power generation, especially coal. 
Indeed, Chinese development banks have provided upwards of $28 billion in financing 
for global coal projects—projects that accentuate climate change and social risks.  Using 
conservative estimates of the climate and local health costs of coal plant emissions, we 
calculate that the yearly social cost of Chinese overseas coal-fired power plants amounts to 
$29.7 billion.  Assuming a power plant lifetime of 30 years, total social cost could range from 
$117 billion to $892 billion.  
As commodity prices fall and the macroeconomic outlook for many of China’s borrowers declines, 
China will need to diversify its global energy portfolio. To meet these goals Chinese overseas development 
finance will need to make a significant change in composition of its lending portfolio.  Such a shift will 
not only help China’s banks mitigate the significant risks associated with the current portfolio of its 
policy banks, it will also enable China to meet its broader global commitments. Through the newly minted 
Sustainable Development Goals and again at the Paris Climate Summit of 2015 world leaders—China 
included— have committed to steer public finance toward energy and infrastructure in a manner that is 
environmentally sustainable and socially inclusive. Also in 2015, the governments of the United States 
and China committed to “controlling public investment flowing in projects with high pollution and carbon 
emissions both domestically and internationally.” Later in 2016 it is anticipated that China will dub ‘green 
finance’ a global commitment under the G-20 with the establishment of G-20 study groups in both green 
finance and in climate finance.  
This paper is organized in four parts.  Part one presents an overview and estimates of China’s emerging 
development finance architecture.  Part two exhibits our estimates of the extent to which China’s 
development banks are financing energy projects in developing countries in comparative perspective. 
Part three identifies some of the risks associated with China’s overseas energy investments. Part four 
summarizes our findings and provides suggestions for further research and policy. 
31.  China’s Development Finance Architecture in Comparative Perspective
Unlike the Western countries that have been reluctant to increase the capital base of the 
Multilateral Development Banks, China is increasing the paid in capital for its two global policy 
banks and has helped capitalize two new multilateral development banks in the New Development 
Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. According to our estimates, even before these 
new institutions get fully operational, China is emerging as the global leader in development 
finance. In recent years China has helped establish two new multilateral development banks in 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. China has also co-
established at least 13 regional and bi-lateral funds with a number of country as well.  This section 
provides an overview of these banks and funds, the majority of which are (or will be) significantly 
dedicated to financing energy and infrastructure.
Two of China’s policy banks, the China Development Bank (CBD) and the Export-Import Bank 
of China (CHEXIM) already hold more assets than the combined sum of the assets of the Western-
backed multilateral development banks. CHEXIM and the CBD have over $2 trillion in assets, 
whereas the Western-backed banks hold just over $700 billion. That said, China-development 
banks’ international holdings are just 30 percent of total assets, putting the two banks’ international 
assets at around $569 billion, giving China’s policy banks roughly three quarters the amount of 
global assets of the major development banks. 
Figure 1
Source: Authors calculations based on bank annual reports
These two ‘policy banks’ as they are called in China, provide non-concessional and concessional 
(in the case of the CHEXIM) finance in virtually every corner of the world. The CDB holds over 
$1.4 billion in assets with roughly $260 billion overseas—more than the World Bank Group’s 
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4International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.   In just over a decade, China has doubled 
the amount of development finance in the world economy.
New Multilaterals In addition to making stepwise contributions in paid in capital to its two global policy banks, China recently helped found two global development banks, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The NDB was launched in July 2015 by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - collectively known as BRICS coun-
tries. The NDB provides financing to developing countries to help finance sustainable infra-
structure projects, releasing its first set of financing packages for clean energy and largely 
financed from green bond issuances in the Chinese market, in the spring of 2016.  Each BRICS member is expected to put an equal share into establishing the startup capital of $50 billion with a goal of reaching $100 billion. Under the current arrangement membership will be limited to BRICS nations, though future members will eventually be added—with the BRICS countries always holding a minimum of 55 percent voting power.  The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was created to support infrastructure 
construction in the Asia-Pacific region. The AIIB was proposed by China in 2013 and formally started operations in December 2015 after the Articles of Agreement (AoA) entered into 
force with ratification from 17 member states holding 50.1 per cent of the shares. This is in 
accordance with the AoA that requires ratification from 10 member states holding a total number of 50 per cent of the initial subscriptions of the authorized capital stock. By  May 
of 2016, all 57 of AIIB’s Prospective Founding Members (PFMs) have ratified the AoA. The 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) specifies that the authorized capital of AIIB is $100 
billion and the initial subscribed capital is expected to be around $50 billion. AIIB’s invest-ment capacity could reach $250 billion by the end of 2020 in accordance with provisions 
made in its AoA. The Bank will largely co-finance projects with the World Bank (WB) and 
Asian Development Bank (AsDB), particularly in the first years of its operations. 
China-backed development fundsChina has also pioneered a host of bilateral and regional development funds. These funds 
combine to add upwards of $116 billion in development finance provided by the Chinese in recent years.  To our knowledge these funds have never been collated in one place.  Our esti-mate of the breadth of these funds is in Table 1.
A major portion of these investments are in Asia as part of China’s broader “Belt Road Ini-
tiative, with the largest being the $40 billion Silk Road Fund established in 2014 with invest-ment from state institutions including the CHEXIM and CDB. The fund is open to investors from other countries as well and has provisions to expand maritime connectivity between 
5China and the rest of Asia (Central, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East), North and Northeast Africa, and Europe. A related fund is the Green Ecological Silk Road Investment 
Fund, a private equity fund for improving the ecological environment in the region.In the larger Eurasian region, investments include the China-Central and Eastern Euro-
pean (China-CEE) Fund— set up to facilitate financing of projects to enhance inter-connec-
tivity in the region, specifically in Eastern Europe— and the bilateral Russia-China Invest-
ment Fund (RCIF) established by two government-backed investment vehicles, the Russian 
Direct Investment Fund and China Investment Corporation (CIC). The RCIF will invest 70% of its capital in Russia and other CIS countries (currently Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine) and 30% in China. 
Chinese finance also plays a prominent role in the Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
largest to do so is the $20 billion CELAC-China Investment Fund for infrastructure projects, 
followed by the $10 billion dollar China-LAC Industrial Cooperation Fund for medium- and 
long-term financing for industrial investments. Investments in the region further include the 
China-LAC Cooperation Fund, initiated by the Chinese Government to finance projects in LAC 
region in areas including education, water conservancy, and energy. The Fund is housed at the Inter-American Development Bank and includes a private equity (PE) fund administered 
by the Export-Import Bank of China. In addition to these, the China-Mexico Investment Fund was set up to support Chinese and Mexican companies investing in infrastructure, mining, and energy projects in both countries. 
6Table 1
Source: Author’s calculations
Over the last decade China has created a significant platform of public and private invest-ments in Africa. To date the largest of such initiatives is the China-Africa Industrial Capac-
ity Cooperation Fund Company Limited (CAICCF), jointly established by the China Foreign 
Exchange Reserves and Export-Import Bank of China. With $10 billion in pledges, the fund would support infrastructure development, particularly in the transit sector, as well as pro-
vide financing for manufacturing and agriculture projects. Among the state-backed funds is 
the China-Africa Development Fund (CAD Fund), a Chinese private equity fund financed by the CDB, set up in order to stimulate investment in Africa by Chinese companies in power generation, transportation infrastructure, natural resources, and manufacturing.  This fund has $10 billion in pledges and has disbursed upwards of $2billion. The Africa Growing To-
gether Fund (AGTF), is a fund inside the African Development Bank financed by the People’s 
Column1Column2 Column3 Column4
Chinese	Development	Funds	in	the	World	Economy
$USB
Asia
Silk	Road	Fund 40
The	Green	Silk	Road	Fund 4,8
China-ASEAN	Fund	(with	ADB) 1
Eurasia
China-Central	and	Eastern	Europe	Investment	Fund 4
Russia-China	Investment	Fund 2
Latin	America	and	Caribbean
CELAC-China	Investment	Fund 20
China-LAC	Industrial	Cooperation	Fund	 10
China-LAC	Investment	Fund	(with	IADB) 5
China-Mexico	Investment	Fund 2,4
Africa
China	-Africa	Development	Fund 10
Africa	Growing	Together	Fund(with	AfD) 2
China-Africa	Production	Capacity/Industrial	Cooperation	Fund 10
Global	South
South-South	Climate	Fund 3,2
South-South	Cooperation	Fund 2
Total 116,4
7Bank of China, is to finance eligible sovereign and non-sovereign guaranteed development projects in Africa.In the larger arena China seeks to strengthen South-South relations and contribute to 
global development. To this end, China announced the creation of the $3.1 billion South-
South Climate Cooperation Fund in a China-U.S. joint presidential statement on climate 
change in September 2015, to be used to finance initiatives in developing countries world-wide to combat climate change. China also pledged $2 billion in the creation of a South-South 
Cooperation Fund aimed to assist developing countries in implementing their post-2015 de-velopment agenda, as announced last year at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit at the UN headquarters in New York. Plans to create an Academy of South-South Cooperation and Development was also announced, with the aim to facilitate studies and exchanges by developing countries on theories and practices of development suited to their respective national conditions.
2.  Estimating Chinese Energy Finance: A Comparative Analysis
China has doubled the amount of energy finance to national governments since 2007.  Given 
the enormous energy and infrastructure gaps facing the world economy, and recent commitments 
to fill those gaps, such finance is sorely needed and welcome. However, China’s energy portfolio is 
heavily exposed to significant country and macroeconomic risk, as well as climate and social risks.
In this section of the paper we present our estimates of CDB and CHEXIM finance to national 
governments for energy projects across the world. We estimate that between 2005 and 2014, 
China’s policy banks have provided upwards of $128 billion in finance to foreign governments 
for energy.  Comparing China’s energy finance with that of the major regional Western-backed 
MDBs operating in developing countries between 2007 and 2014 (the years we could compile 
comparative data), China almost matches the financing of all the major Western-backed MDBs 
combined.  Table 2 presents the summary data from our exercise.  
8Table 2
Source: Author’s estimates and bank annual reports
China doubles global energy finance
Chinese policy banks have doubled the amount of finance for energy projects (extraction, 
refining, power plants, and distribution) to developing countries.  As Table 2 exhibits, between 
2007 and 2014 China’s banks have provided upwards of $117 billion in energy finance.  The CDB 
provided 60 percent of the total for Chinaand averaged roughly $8.3 billion per year in loans and 
the CHEXIM provided 40 percent of the loans at approximately $5 billion per year—combining to 
$13.5 billion per year. The largest single development bank financier of energy is the World Bank, 
averaging $10 billion per year.  The ADB provides $3.6 billion, and the IADB and AfDB provide 
$1.3 and $1.6 billion respectively.  
	
Development*Bank*Finance*for*Energy,*2007:2014
Bank ($USm) annual-ave
World&Bank 72,219&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 10,317&&&&&&&&
AsDB 25,410&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 3,630&&&&&&&&&&
IADB 9,631&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 1,376&&&&&&&&&&
AfDB 11,676&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 1,668&&&&&&&&&&
China&Banks 117,590&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 16,799&&&&&&&&
China&Banks 117,590&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 16,799&&&&&&&&
MDBs 118,936&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 16,991&&&&&&&&
Total 236,526&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
9China’s energy finance is truly ‘global’ 
The CDB and CHEXIM are truly global development banks, providing finance to all corners of 
the world in a manner similar to that of the World Bank.  Moreover, Chinese policy banks largely 
do not overlap with country set of energy borrowers working with the World Bank, therefore 
Methodology
We relied on a number of data sources and methods to generate the estimates for China policy bank lending to foreign governments for energy projects.  Chinese banks 
do not regularly publish detailed figures on their loan activities.  The methodology and approach is thus built out of two parallel efforts and approaches to estimate the 
total amount of Chinese development bank finance in Latin America and in Africa led by researchers at Boston University and Johns Hopkins University research teams 
(see Gallagher and Irwin, 2015; Gallagher and Myers, 2016; Brautigam and Gallagher, 
2014; and Hwang, Brautigam, and Eom, 2016).  These databases for Africa and Latin 
America examine a wide range of sources, including government finance ministry and central bank, Chinese bank, and press reports in both China and borrowing countries, in order to compile a list of loans and their characteristics. In-depth interviews with key 
officials also provide helpful information.  Loans are not included in these databases unless 
there are at least two sources of verification outside of a press report.  These teams received 
verification from both CDB and CHEXIM in some informal interviews that the loans we include in the database are valid and that our estimates are in the right order of 
magnitude but we are not able to confirm our estimates at a project-by-project basis. 
For Chinese energy finance outside of Africa and Latin America we first compiled 
finance estimates from the previous work of others such as Downes, 2012; Herve-
Mignucci and Wang, 2015; NRDC, 2015; Ueno, Yanagi, and Nakano, 2014; and Aidata, 
2014).  Finally, we then deployed the same methodology as the Africa and Latin America databases—and thus including only those projects from these sources and 
an independent global search that that we were able to confirm according to our criteria above.   Although we have gone to great pains to provide as reliable estimates as possible, 
they should not be taken as precise figures. It is possible that we have underestimated Chinese global energy by failing to document certain loans that we have missed—
especially outside Africa and Latin America.  It is also possible that we may overestimate in some cases, especially for those loans made in only recent years that may not fully come to fruition or become canceled. 
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expanding the overall set of countries with access to development bank finance for energy.  
Project-level data is available for the World Bank dating back to 2005.  Therefore, for Table 3 
we can compare the geographical distribution of Chinese policy bank lending to that of the World 
Bank.  
Table 3
Source: Author’s estimates and WB annual reports 
As we can see, Chinese banks provided more than one and a half times the amount of energy 
finance than the World Bank did during the period, and provided more finance to each region of 
the world except for in Africa and in the Middle East.  When comparing Chinese energy finance 
for foreign governments with the regional MDBs for the period 2007 to 2014, the two China banks 
provide more energy finance to Asia as a whole than does the ADB ($33.5 billion versus $25.4 
billion), more energy finance to Latin America and the Caribbean than does the IADB ($33.2 
versus $9.6 billion), and more finance to Africa than does the AfDB ($17.8 billion versus $11.6 
billion).
3.  Risks Associated with Chinese Overseas Energy Finance
China’s global energy portfolio is heavily exposed to country, macroeconomic, climate, 
and social risks however. To mitigate such risks and meet the broader sustainable development 
challenge for the 21st Century, China’s development finance will need to shift the composition of 
its global energy lending in a significant manner. This section of the paper identifies two broad 
	
Geographical,Distribution,of,Chinese,and,World,Bank,Energy,Finance,,2005@2014
China&Banks World&Bank
Africa 17,883 18,063
Middle2East2&2North2Africa 366 5,121
South2Asia 17,513 14,107
Latin2America2&2Caribbean 33,232 9,672
Europe2&2Central2Asia 42,889 17,137
East2Asia2&2Pacific 15,907 13,565
Total 127,789 77,665
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sets of risk that are associated with China’s overseas development finance. The first is country and 
macroeconomic risk, where Chinese policy banks are engaged with countries with higher country 
risk ratings and in commodity-backed loans that risk stress given the fall in commodity prices 
and associated macroeconomic downturns in the developing world. The second is climate and 
social risks, where China’s coal and large hydropower plants are associated with significant social 
conflict and environmental cost. Indeed, using estimates of the emissions associated with China’s 
overseas coal projects, we calculate that the annual social costs of China’s overseas coal assets are 
upwards of $27 billion per year.
Country and Macro-economic Risk
Chinese finance also appears to go to a different set of countries in the world—expanding 
the set of nations with access to energy finance. Table 4 lists the top 20 country recipients of 
Chinese and World Bank energy finance—representing 98 percent of all China’s energy loans and 
67 percent of the World Bank’s between 2007 and 2014. Thirteen countries on China’s top 20 list 
do not receive financing from the World Bank in any significant amount. These thirteen countries 
receive roughly $76 billion in financing from the Chinese banks—more than the entire amount of 
energy finance provided by the World Bank during the period.
12
Table 4
 
Source: Author database and OECD (2016)
Chinese banks are expanding the amount of energy finance available to foreign governments in 
part because the Chinese appear to be willing to take on more risk. The average OECD risk rating 
for the World Bank’s top 20 recipients of energy finance is 5.25 (where 1 is low risk and ten is 
high). The Chinese bank’s risk average is just a bit higher at 5.75, but the 13 countries on China’s 
list that do not appear on the World Bank’s have an average country risk rating of 6.4.  
Part of the reason why Chinese banks may be willing to take on more risk may be because 
they are less beholden to Western credit ratings. A recent G-24 Finance Ministers report showed 
that the Western-backed MDBs have become highly concerned about their credit ratings and have 
become less apt to lend to certain groups of countries whereas China’s banks can rely on deep 
Chinese capital markets (Humphrey, 2015). Moreover, these banks may be willing to take on 
more risk because China’s foreign policy is to not discriminate on the basis of borrowing country 
governments’ domestic policy and behavior, whereas the MDBs often have a set of domestic policy 
conditions that make it less apt to finance certain governments. Finally, Chinese banks appear to 
Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5
		Twenty	Top	Recipients	of	Chinese	Energy	Finance
		Country Amount	($m) no	WB OECD	risk	rating
		Russia 31.000																			 * 4
		Brazil 12.576																			 4
		India 8.944																					 3
		Ecuador 8.374																					 * 6
		Turkmenistan	 8.100																					 * 6
		Pakistan 6.948																					 * 7
		Indonesia 6.935																					 3
		Venezuela 6.020																					 * 7
		Vietnam 5.171																					 5
		Argentina 4.914																					 * 7
		Ethiopia 2.277																					 * 7
		Niger 2.215																					 * 7
		Sudan 2.084																					 * 7
		Cambodia 1.776																					 * 6
		Ghana 1.713																					 6
		Kazakhstan 1.647																					 * 6
		Sri	Lanka 1.341																					 * 6
		Bosnia	&	Herzegovina 1.326																					 * 7
		Zambia 1.187																					 5
		Tanzania 1.164																					 6
5,8
115.710														 76.244												 0,658918133 6,4
0,99																				
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take on more risk because they secure some of the loans with commodities.
Commodity-backed loans and Macroeconomic Risks
Securing loans with commodities to borrowers with higher country risk were an innovative 
hedge for China’s policy banks during the commodity boom, but may now accentuate the 
macroeconomic risks that China faces in its loan portfolio to developing countries. Almost half 
of the energy projects financed by Chinese development banks (in terms of dollar volume) are 
‘commodity backed’ whereby a portion of the loan is repaid in the form of collateral.  Almost 
all of the energy loans in our database that are commodity backed, about 40 percent of all loans, 
are backed by oil sales. However, Ghana secured a Chinese loan for its Bui Dam hydropower 
project with the export of cocoa beans.  In countries without good credit ratings and therefore 
little ability to reliably provide guarantees, a resource guarantee increases security and lowers 
risk, and allows projects to be financed at better interest rates. That said, across Africa, China has 
secured loans from copper, diamond, cocoa and other sales (Brautigam and Gallagher, 2014). This 
form of finance has been practiced in China for over a decade and by Japan for a considerable 
amount of time (Brautigam, 2009). Indeed, securing loans to municipalities through land collateral 
was a cornerstone of the CDB’s domestic finance strategy on the Chinese mainland (Forsyth and 
Sanderson, 2014).
14
Table 5
The mechanics of the guarantee work as follows. The process usually begins with a framework 
agreement between a host country ministry of finance and a Chinese policy bank. Chinese bank then 
asks for a letter of application from the borrowing country’s ministry of finance, an engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) contract with a Chinese company, a project feasibility study, 
and an environmental impact assessment. Following that, a Chinese importer signs a purchase 
agreement with the (usually state-owned) company selling the commodity. The borrowing 
government would then sign the loan agreement with the Chinese bank, and the proceeds from a 
specified amount of the export (usually in quantity, rather than value) get deposited into an escrow 
account with the Chinese bank and drawn down to repay the EPC contract loan. Thus it is not the 
export commodity itself that repays the loan, as in a true barter system, but the proceeds from the 
sale of the commodity (Brautigam, 2009; Brautigam and Gallagher, 2014).
During the commodity boom, that itself was partly fueled by China, commodity-backed loans 
looked like a good bet. As long as commodity prices were rising China’s policy banks appeared 
to be hedging country risk by guaranteeing repayment through commodity sales. In the current 
environment however commodity backed loans appear to be doubly risky. Commodity prices are 
down significantly, with the overall commodity price index down 19 percent since August of 2015 
and oil and gas down 32 percent--and thus so are growth prospects in much of the developing 
	
China's(Oil+Backed(Lines(of(Credit:(Illustrative(List
Date Country Purpose Energy0Sector Energy0sub4sector Lender Amount0($m)
2009 Brazil Exploit/pre1salt/oil/fields Oil Extraction/Refinery CDB 10,000//////////
2003 Congo1B Imboulou/Hydropower Hydro Power/Generation Ex1Im/Bank 238///////////////
2011 Ecuador Various Misc. Power/Generation CDB 2,000////////////
2010 Ecuador
80%/discretionary,/20%/
oil/ Oil Extraction/Refinery CDB 1,000////////////
2002 Nigeria Omotosho/Power/Plant/I Gas Power/Generation Ex1Im/Bank 115///////////////
2002 Nigeria
Papalanto/Gas1Fire/
Power/Station Gas Power/Generation Ex1Im/Bank 115///////////////
2005 Russia
oil/export/revenue1
backed/loan/agreements/ Oil Extraction/Refinery CDB 6,000////////////
2009 Russia
oil/export/revenue1
backed/loan/agreements/ Oil Extraction/Refinery CDB 10,000//////////
2009 Russia
oil/export/revenue1
backed/loan/agreements/ Oil Extraction/Refinery CDB 15,000//////////
2009 Sudan Al1Fulah/Power/Plant Gas Power/Generation Ex1Im/Bank 680///////////////
2000 Sudan El1Jaili/Power/Station Gas Power/Generation Ex1Im/Bank 149///////////////
2010 Sudan
Power/transmission/to/
South/Kordofan Electricity Distribution Ex1Im/Bank 274///////////////
2009 Turkmenistan/
development/of/South/
Yolotan/natural/gas/field Gas Extraction/Refinery CDB 4,000////////////
2012 Venezuela
Purchase/of/oil1related/
goods/and/services/from/
China Oil Extraction/Refinery CDB 500///////////////
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world, especially for commodity producers in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (IMF, 2016).  Lack 
of export demand and low growth prospects are triggering currency depreciations and capital 
outflows as well—accentuating financial fragility and further credit downgrades. With commodity 
prices down export revenue may fall short of the dollars necessary to repay bank loans to China 
and beyond. What is more, lower commodity prices bring less foreign exchange to host country 
governments to cover the commodity-sale losses. Currency depreciations mean host countries have 
to come up with significantly more units of local currency in order to pay the dollar-denominated 
loans to China’s policy banks.
Climate Risk:  Fossil Fuel Extraction, Hydropower, and Coal Plants
The majority of Chinese energy finance flows into fossil fuel extraction, large hydroelectric 
projects, and coal plants—exposing Chinese policy banks to significant climate change and social 
risk. Most Chinese energy finance flows toward power generation projects, with distribution and 
extraction coming in second and third (see Figure 2). In terms of distribution the Chinese have 
financed oil and gas pipelines such in Brazil, Angola and elsewhere.  Chinese policy banks have 
also provided financing for transmission lines such as the Cambodia Phnom Penh—Baray Power 
Transmission and Transformation Project. In terms of extraction the Chinese banks are financing 
pre-salt exploration in Brazil and refineries in Russia.
Figure 2
                      
Source: Authors calculations
Ninety-three percent of all Chinese investment in the power sector is dominated by coal 
and hydroelectric finance.  Sixty-six percent of the power generation projects financed by Chinese 
policy banks are in the coal sector. The second largest destination for Chinese power generation 
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finance is in hydroelectric power plants at 27 percent. Table 6 shows how Chinese investment in 
power generation stands in stark contrast to the other MDBs engaged in the energy sector.
Table 6
Source: Authors calculations based on own estimates and bank annual reports
Chinese financial commitments in renewable energy are the smallest when compared to the 
MDBs.  On average, the MDBs devote 88 percent of their energy finance portfolio to renewable 
energy. China devotes 28 percent of its portfolio to renewables. Hydropower is the largest recipient 
of MDB renewable energy financing, as is the case with China. Whereas China has provided 
just one percent of its power generation portfolio toward renewable energy sources outside of 
the hydropower sector, the MDBs invest 27 percent on non-hydro renewable energy. China is 
financing a modest wind power projects in Ecuador and Ethiopia, as well as solar power in the 
Sudan.
The most striking contrast is in the coal sector, where Chinese banks earmark 66 percent of 
their power generation portfolio. Chinese policy banks are financing more than 45 coal plants 
across the globe for upwards of $28 billion in financing. Chinese policy banks comprise 89 percent 
of the coal plants currently being financed by the MDBs in the sample. China’s banks are followed 
by the AfD, which finances 6 coal projects in Africa and the ADB finances four.  
Table 7 lists the twelve largest coal-fired power plants financed or co-financed by Chinese 
Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5 Column6
Distribution	of	Power	Projects	across	Development	Banks,	2007-2014
China WB IADB AfD AsDB
coal 66% 0% 0% 3% 7%
gas 2% 25% 1% 0% 0%
oil 5% 2% 6% 3% 0%
hydro 27% 50% 79% 53% 62%
wind 1% 5% 0% 0% 15%
solar 0% 16% 12% 41% 6%
bioenergy 0% 2% 1% 0% 10%
Renewable	 28% 73% 93% 94% 93%
Renewable	Non-hydro 1% 23% 14% 41% 31%
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policy banks. These 12 projects represent 60 percent of all of the coal plants (by dollar volume) 
in China’s portfolio. With the exception of the IGCC plant in the United States, researchers at the 
University of Tokyo estimate that Chinese overseas coal plants are relatively less efficient than 
those that are financed by Japan’s overseas development bank and export credit agency (Ueono 
et al, 2014). Moroever, researchers at the Climate Policy Initiative project that China has planned 
another $35 to $72 billion in new coal plants in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Russia, Vietnam, and 
beyond (Herve-Mignucci and Wang, 2015).
Table 7
	
China's(Largest(Policy(Bank(Financed(Coal(Projects
Country Project Name Lender Amount ($m) 
India Various+power+plants+of+Reliance+Power+ CDB+&+Ex;Im+Bank 5,450+++++++++++++++++
Indonesia Bangko+Tengah,+aka+South+Sumatra+8+or+Sumsel;8 CDB 1,200+++++++++++++++++
Australia China+First+Coal Ex;Im+Bank 1,200+++++++++++++++++
Vietnam Vinh+Tan+1+Coal;Fired+Thermal+Power+Plant CDB,+Ex;Im+Bank,+ICBC,+BOC+&+Sinosure 1,170+++++++++++++++++
Kazakhstan Upgrade+Atyrau+Refinery Ex;Im+Bank 1,130+++++++++++++++++
India Sasan+UMPP CDB,+Ex;Im+Bank+&+Sinosure 1,100+++++++++++++++++
Vietnam Duyen+Hai+1+ Ex;Im+Bank+&+Sinosure 1,008+++++++++++++++++
Vietnam Duyen+Hai+3 CDB,+Sinosure/BOC+&+ICBC 1,000+++++++++++++++++
US Summit+IGCC+Plant+Odessa+Texas Ex;Im+Bank 1,000+++++++++++++++++
Sri+Lanka Norochcholai+2+ Ex;Im+Bank 891++++++++++++++++++++
Bosnia+&+Herzegovina Tuzla+7 Ex;Im+Bank 882++++++++++++++++++++
Indonesia Celukan+Bawang+ CDB 880++++++++++++++++++++
According to a parallel analysis using these data, the majority of coal-fired power plants in 
our analysis (58 percent) deploy sub-critical coal technology—the most energy efficient and thus 
most carbon dioxide intensive. However, some of China’s coal-fired power plants deploy ‘cleaner’ 
coal technologies such as an ultra-supercritical plant in Egypt and the trend may be going in this 
direction. Since 2013, only 26% of China supported coal plants used sub-critical technology and 
clustered in Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa (Gallagher, 2016). 
Holding assets in coal is increasingly associated with risk. According to a study by Oxford 
University researchers, over 290 GW of coal plants will need to be closed by 2020 to meet climate 
change and local health regulations.  Investors globally are thus reassessing their coal holdings to 
account for the fact that they may become ‘stranded assets’. Fixed income and equity investors are 
reassign yields and dividends and even considering divesting. In light of this, credit rating agencies 
too are reassessing rates and ratings needed to compensate for the increased risk of coal assets 
(Caldecott et al, 2015).  
The global coal sector is also considered to be increasingly associated with significant social 
risk as well. Global climate change activists, local communities, and others have waged global 
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campaigns to halt the expansion of coal plants across the globe. Such efforts have left many 
stranded assets in the global coal sector and have carried real costs for investors.  Chinese banks are 
increasingly the target of such campaigns that in the end could lead to stranded assets for China’s 
policy banks that would not only hurt their bottom line, but their reputation moving forward.  Such 
is the case in Bangladesh, where local police killed four people in April 2106 during a public 
demonstration against a coal-fired power plant planned in Chittagong (Vidal, 2016).
Global campaigns have led to the banning of coal finance for many of the Western-backed 
MDBs, as well as a set of OECD guidelines that restrict coal financing by export-credit agencies. 
The majority of the Western-backed MDBs now have policies in place that limit their ability to 
invest in coal given that coal is the most carbon intensive form of fossil fuel combustion. The 
World Bank and the IADB now follow policies where they do not fund coal plants except under 
specific circumstances whereby there are no feasible alternatives and the electricity generated 
would prioritize the poor and under “exceptional circumstances where countries have few or no 
prospects for other energy sources” (Jowit 2010). In 2013, the United States government issued 
an executive order limiting the ability of the United States to participate in the financing of coal 
projects unless under similar circumstances and in 2014 issued a further executive order mandating 
that US development finance be climate resilient (US Treasury, 2013; 2014).  In the wake of the 
Paris climate agreements the OECD has also agreed upon guidelines that limit export-credit agency 
finance for coal as well. What is more, even private banks are now the target of coal financing as 
have some Chinese banks (NRDC et al, 2015). 
Coal is of growing scrutiny because of its significant social and environment costs. According 
to calculations by Gallagher (2016), the coal-fired power plants in our database are estimated to 
release 594 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon dioxide over on an annual basis.  Put in perspective, 
these emissions amount to 11% of total U.S. emissions and 6% of total Chinese emissions in 2014 
during the most recent year available. Taken together China’s policy bank financed overseas coal 
plants would be the eighth largest emitter of carbon dioxide emissions, more on an annual basis 
than Canada, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, or the United Kingdom. If a 30-year lifetime of these plants is 
assumed, China-financed coal plants will cumulatively emit 17,828 MMT of carbon dioxide, equal 
to more than triple total U.S. emissions in 2015, 1.5 times Chinese emissions in 2014, or slightly 
more than U.S. and Chinese emissions put together on an annual basis (Gallagher 2016). 
Based on those emissions estimates, in this paper we estimate the economic costs of China-
financed coal plants world wide. If social damage to human health from fossil fuels in power 
generation is considered in economic terms, along with the externalities associated with CO2 
emissions (assumed to be $50/ton of CO2), the cost of fossil fuel-fired power generation rises. The 
range of costs associated with climate change externalities is high, reflecting uncertainty about the 
rate and severity of the negative impacts of climate change under different scenarios and different 
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discount rates. To manage this uncertainty, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 
has analyzed the impact of the estimated avoided external costs of CO2 emissions for 26 countries, 
assuming external costs of $20/ton of CO2 and also $80/ton of CO2 to allow for uncertainty over 
the potential costs of climate change (IRENA, 2016). For this paper we used the midpoint of the 
range to calculate external costs of carbon dioxide emission from Chinese development finance 
investment in coal-fired powers from 2001 to 2015. The annual social cost of Chinese overseas 
coal-fired power amounts to $29.7 billion. Assuming a power plant lifetime of 30 years, the total 
cost ranges from $117 billion to  $892 billion assuming a range of discount rates from 7 percent 
to zero. A four percent discount rate would put the total social cost of these power plants at $661 
billion.   
China’s commitments in renewable energy may face climate and social risks as well. Chinese 
financial commitments in renewable energy are the smallest when compared to the MDBs.  Going 
back to Table 6, on average, the Western-backed MDBs in developing regions devote 88 percent 
of their energy finance portfolio to renewable energy. China devotes 28 percent of its portfolio to 
renewables. Hydropower is the largest recipient of MDB renewable energy financing, as is the case 
with China.  As can be seen in the table, the other MDBs exhibited here are less engaged in the 
hydroelectric sector, especially in large hydro projects.   
Large hydroelectric projects tend to highly controversial with local communities and in some 
regions hydro projects can actually increase greenhouse gas emissions. The Latin American region 
is a case in point, where tropical hydroelectric projects have long been associated with increases 
in methane emissions and emissions from associated deforestation. Comprehensive reviews of 
estimates find that tropical hydroelectric plants tend to emit 7 to 15 times more emissions than 
non-tropical hydropower, and 2 to 3 times more emissions than gas, oil, or coal plants (Barro et al, 
2011; Steinhurst et al, 2012). This is due to the fact that methane emissions are more potent from 
tropical dams, and because new roads and infrastructure sprout as a resulting from new dams can 
cause further carbon emitting deforestation (Fearnside 1997, 2012, 2015). 
In addition to emissions increases huge changes caused by large dams can lead to the loss of 
aquatic biodiversity, massive costal erosion and other problems. These environmental impacts are 
exacerbated when local regulations are relatively weak. For example, In the Brazilian Amazon, 
every kilometer of legal road in wilderness areas is often accompanied by three kilometers of illegal 
roads (Barber et al. 2014). Even improvement of existing roads and highways may exacerbate 
the negative impacts because better road conditions facilitalte more and faster traffic in sensitive 
areas, which in turn, increase the likelihood of road kill of animals (Benítez-López, Alkemade 
and Verweij, 2010; Laurance, Goosem and Laurance, 2009). Similar impacts can be found in 
large hydro plants and mining projects in remote areas, as they often need to construct road and 
power transmission networks. As noted earlier, it is estimated that the deforestation of Amazon 
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will increase 950,000 hectares by 2032 due to the construction of 12 dams on the Tapajós River 
and their road networks (Barreto et al, 2014). In 2014, the US Congress also passed legislation 
that included a provision whereby “The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States 
executive director of each international financial institution that it is the policy of the United States 
to oppose any loan, grant, strategy or policy of such institution to support the construction of any 
large hydroelectric dam, (Brossard, 2014).
Large hydro plants have been the focus of social concern as well. The World Bank-backed 
Ixiamas-San Buenaventura road project has become the focus of significant concern. Critics 
of the project worry that the project will increase deforestation and illegal logging in Bolivia, 
overfishing, a decrease in tourist revenue, and contamination of local waterways. In addition, 
there are concerns that the project will trigger the displacement of indigenous peoples and erode 
traditional cultural values (Bank Information Center, 2015). The Mareña Renovables wind farm 
in Oaxaca Mexico, financed by the IADB, has split local communities. The project has been 
halted due to local protests on more than one occasion, even though there is significant support 
from some community members.  In 2014, members of two indigenous communities brought a 
petition of 2000 signatures to the IADB demanding that the bank rescind its plans (Nauman, 2013). 
China has experienced significant opposition to its large hydro dams in Asia and Africa as well 
(International Rivers, 2012).
Whereas China has provided just one percent of its power generation portfolio toward 
renewable energy sources outside of the hydropower sector, the MDBs invest 27 percent on non-
hydro renewable energy. China is financing a modest wind power projects in Ecuador and Ethiopia, 
as well as solar power in the Sudan. There is enormous potential for China’s development banks to 
diversify into these types of renewable energy investments.  Solar and wind energy are now price 
competitive with coal and gas, but are hindered by up front capital costs.  Indeed, solar, wind, and 
biomass production could more than double by 2030 if such costs were addressed (IRENA, 2016). 
Development banks are uniquely poised to smooth such cost structures given their longer-term 
maturity horizons and deeper levels of capital.  
4.  Summary and Implications for Policy
Over the past decade China’s national development banks have accumulated global assets that 
rival the assets of the Western-backed MDBs.  Moreover, China’s banks have already emerged 
as the leading financiers of energy projects to developing country governments, doubling the 
amount of energy financing since 2007. In addition to its national development banks, China 
has recently co-founded two major multilateral development banks and at least thirteen regional 
funding instruments that will increase China-backed development finance by at least an order of 
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magnitude. This new source of development finance is a tremendous opportunity for the world 
economy, but it also carries new risks.
For this paper we track the rise of China’s national development banks, China’s newly co-
founded MDBs, and China’s numerous funds across the world. We then compare those estimates 
with the published assessments of Western-backed MDB financing.  We find that Chinese banks 
and funds already hold more assets than their Western-backed counterparts even before the two 
new MDBs that China has co-founded—the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the 
New Development Bank (NDB)—have started giving loans.
We also estimate the levels of energy financing that China’s two ‘policy banks’—the China 
Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM)--provide to foreign 
governments and compare those to their Western MDB counterparts. We estimate that China’s 
development banks have provided upwards of $128 billion in energy finance to developing country 
governments between 2005 and 2014. Comparable data for the MDBs only exists for the period 
2007 to 2014, and during that period China’s development banks provided $117 billion during 
the period or $16 billion per year—roughly the same amount as the World Bank and the regional 
MDBs combined.  
China’s national development banks have truly ‘gone global.’ The CDB and CHEXIM have a 
presence in almost every major region of the world.  What is more, these two banks have expanded 
into countries that the traditional MDBs have shied away from, thus expanding the set of countries 
that have access to long-run energy financing.  
Chinese banks now appear to be significantly exposed to country, macro-economic, and other 
risks.  Many of the nations that receive the bulk of China’s overseas energy finance have a higher 
risk of default than the top recipients of energy finance from the Western-backed MDBs.  Indeed, 
many of the recipients of Chinese energy finance are commodities exporters in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America that are experiencing accentuated macro-economic turbulence. While commodity-
backed loans to these countries seemed like a way to hedge some of the country risk involved with 
China’s loans, the global fall in commodities prices exarcerbates the level of risk entailed with 
these loans.
Given the massive energy and infrastructure gaps facing developing countries, and the need 
to transform the world economy toward a low-carbon energy future, this finance is very welcome 
and could not come at a better time.  That said, China’s energy portfolio is also exposed to climate 
and social risk.  According to our estimates, the vast majority of the energy finance provided by 
Chinese development banks is in the fossil fuel sector—both in terms of extraction/refining and 
in power generation. Eighty percent of all Chinese development bank energy finance is in power 
generation.  Sixty-six percent of all power generation by these two banks is in the coal sector. 
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China’s renewable energy portfolio is concentrated in large hydropower projects which can also 
have climate risk and are often a source of significant social risks for Chinese banks.
Diversifying China’s global energy portfolio toward cleaner energy technologies will help 
Chinese policy banks mitigate the risks associated with primary commodities and meet broader 
sustainable development goals. Through the newly minted Sustainable Development Goals and 
again at the Paris Climate Summit of 2015 world leaders—China included-- have committed to 
steer public finance toward energy and infrastructure in a manner that is environmentally sustainable 
and socially inclusive.  Also in 2015, the governments of the United States and China committed to 
“controlling public investment flowing in projects with high pollution and carbon emissions both 
domestically and internationally.” Later in 2016 it is anticipated that China will dub ‘green finance’ 
a global commitment under the G-20.  
It will be a significant challenge for the Chinese banks and the newly created China-backed 
funds to shift toward a more sustainable energy portfolio. China is uniquely poised because it 
controls a variety of instruments that could be blended toward supporting a global energy finance 
agenda that is more low-carbon and socially inclusive. China is suited to blend non-concessional 
and concessional finance, as well as its climate change funds, to broker deals that can deliver 
sustainable energy to borrowers and benefit the bottom line for China’s policy banks.  Such will be 
the central challenge for these institutions over the next half decade.
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